'Dreams don't come true in Eritrea': anomie and family disintegration due to the structural militarisation of society by Hirt, Nicole & Mohammad, Abdulkader Saleh
www.ssoar.info
'Dreams don't come true in Eritrea': anomie
and family disintegration due to the structural
militarisation of society
Hirt, Nicole; Mohammad, Abdulkader Saleh
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hirt, N., & Mohammad, A. S. (2013). 'Dreams don't come true in Eritrea': anomie and family disintegration due to the
structural militarisation of society. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 51(1), 139-168. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0022278X12000572
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-383422
The Journal of Modern African
Studies
http://journals.cambridge.org/MOA
Additional services for The Journal of Modern
African Studies:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
‘Dreams don't come true in Eritrea’: anomie and
family disintegration due to the structural
militarisation of society
Nicole Hirt and Abdulkader Saleh Mohammad
The Journal of Modern African Studies / Volume 51 / Issue 01 / March 2013, pp 139 - 168
DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X12000572, Published online: 25 February 2013
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022278X12000572
How to cite this article:
Nicole Hirt and Abdulkader Saleh Mohammad (2013). ‘Dreams don't come true in
Eritrea’: anomie and family disintegration due to the structural militarisation of
society. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 51, pp 139-168 doi:10.1017/
S0022278X12000572
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/MOA, IP address: 213.39.242.4 on 22 Apr 2014
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
‘Dreams don’t come true in
Eritrea’: anomie and family
disintegration due to the
structural militarisation
of society*
NICOLE HIRT
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African
Affairs, Neuer Jungfernstieg ,  Hamburg, Germany
Email: hirt@giga-hamburg.de
and
ABDULKADER SALEH MOHAMMAD
University of Oslo, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology
and Human Geography, Moltke Moes vei ,  Oslo, Norway
Email: a.s.mohammed@sosgeo.uio.no
A B S T R A C T
This article analyses contemporary Eritrea’s acute crisis within the framework of
the theory of anomie. It is based on the hypothesis that militarisation, forced
labour, mass exodus and family disintegration can be interpreted as the con-
sequences of two incompatible norm and value systems: the collectivist, national-
istic and militaristic worldview of the former liberation front and ruling party
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and the traditional cultural
system of Eritrea’s society. In  the regime introduced an unlimited
‘development campaign’, thereby forcing large parts of the society to live as
conscripts and perform unpaid labour. This has caused a mass exodus of young
people and a rapid process of family disintegration. The article is based on
empirical ﬁeldwork and evaluates the ongoing developments which have led to
rapid economic decline and the destabilisation of the entire fabric of society.
* Our profound gratitude goes to the Fritz-Thyssen Foundation, Cologne, Germany for
supporting our research project on the militarisation of Eritrean society from –.
We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of the text for their constructive
comments and suggestions.
J. of Modern African Studies, ,  (), pp. – © Cambridge University Press 
doi:./SX
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
I N T R O D U C T I O N
When a correspondent from the Financial Times visited Eritrea
in summer , a young woman told him, ‘When I was younger,
I had hopes and dreams here. Now I don’t expect anything. I take
things as they come. Dreams don’t come true in Eritrea’ (Financial
Times ). ‘When I was younger’ refers to the time prior to the
introduction of the Warsay-Yikealo Development Campaign (WYDC)
in , which was implemented two years after the end of a
devastating war with Ethiopia (–). When the ‘border war’
broke out in May  due to the failure of both the Eritrean and
Ethiopian governments to solve a bundle of latent conﬂicts related
to economic, political, psychological and border issues peacefully,
many young Eritreans were prepared to defend their country’s inde-
pendence because at that time most of them trusted in the capability of
their leadership to bring about a better future and considered the
‘TPLF-led Ethiopian invasion’ as a threat to their new-born nation.
When the war ended with the defeat of the Eritrean troops and the
occupation of Eritrean territories by the Ethiopian army in summer
, there were feelings of both disillusion and relief that the war was
over.
The youth of the country now aspired to ﬁnally live life in peace, to
complete their educations, to have families, and to enjoy life together
with their loved ones. Most of them were ready to fulﬁl their ‘national
duty’,  months of military training and reconstruction service, but
then they expected to return to a civilian lifestyle.
In November , the government of Eritrea, formerly the Eritrea
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), introduced a mandatory national
service (Proclamation on National Service No. /), for all
Eritreans, male and female, aged –. Initially, this service included
six months of military training and twelve months of work on recon-
struction and development projects. One important aim of the national
service is ‘to serve as an instrument for socialising Eritrean youth into
the values and characteristics of the EPLF’ (Kibreab a: ). In
early , a few months before the war with Ethiopia started, a
national development campaign was announced and all those who had
participated in the national service since its initiation in  and who
had since ﬁnished their military training were remobilised (ibid.).
When the war started, they were directly integrated into their speciﬁc
army positions. Since the end of the war in  there has been no
signiﬁcant demobilisation of the army, which consists of more than
 N I C O L E H I R T A N D A B D U L K A D E R S A L E H M O H A M M A D
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
, people, while every year new rounds of young men and women
have been drafted (see Hughes ).
In summer  the government announced the so-called Warsay-
Yikealo Development Campaign. The younger generation is referred to
as Warsay, meaning ‘inheritor’ or ‘follower’, while Yikealo denotes a wise
elderly person, a term the government uses explicitly for the ﬁghter
generation. The younger generation is supposed to follow in the
footsteps of the former ﬁghters by internalising and practicing the
values of self-sacriﬁce, hard work and dedication to the Eritrean nation
in the form of unlimited reconstruction and development service for
which they receive food for themselves, but not for their dependants,
and some pocket-money. The introduction of the WYDC meant de facto
that the national service was no longer limited to  months but rather
became open-ended. With the exception of women over , married
women, and those with children, only those with serious medical
problems are discharged. The rest of the younger generation work on
infrastructure projects or are employed at large cash-crop farms run by
the army or at party-owned business enterprises in the construction
service after completion of their military training. They earn a ‘salary’ of
approximately  nakfa per month (about E) and live under
military discipline even when working on civil activities. Party-owned
construction ﬁrms operate mainly with national service conscripts and
have thus ‘free access to unpaid skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled
labour’ (Kibreab b: ). The four military command zones are
involved in economic activities such as trading, farming, property
development and infrastructure construction, all of which are based on
the labour of the conscripts. Better-educated conscripts may also serve in
the public sector as teachers, nurses or ofﬁce clerks (Bozzini : ).
Thus, it is the government, the PFDJ, and the senior army ofﬁcers that
are the beneﬁciaries of the campaign (Kibreab a: ; Human
Rights Watch (HRW) ). Before private ﬁrms were banned from the
construction industry in April , they could ‘hire’ conscripts for
employment – their wages being payable to the Ministry of Defence
(Kibreab a: –). Since , they have also been used as forced
labourers at the Bisha mining project in Gash-Barka, which is operated
as a joint venture by the Canadian company Nevsun Resources and the
Eritrean Mining Corporation (see Asmarino.com ). Large parts of
the population are thus unable to establish a family or care for their
wives and children or their elderly parents. The way of life forced
upon the recruits stands in stark contrast to the established forms of
making a living. As this paper will explain, the WYDC is causing social
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anomie by making it impossible to reconcile private norms and values,
such as concentrating on education and aspiring to a career, with the
nationalist demands of the government. This creates a highly anomic
situation in which traditional and national norms and demands are
incompatible.
This paper discusses the theoretical background – the concept of
anomie developed by Durkheim (), modiﬁed by Merton (),
and adapted to the context of authoritarian societies by Waldmann
() – and then applies it to the Eritrean context. The following
sections analyse the profound anomie that has developed in the s
in the aftermath of the political clampdown on internal critics of the
president and on journalists of the free press, and the totalitarisation of
the political system. In the absence of rule of law and the freedom to
travel, crossing the borders illegally under the threat of death is the only
alternative young Eritreans have if they want to escape the militarised life
imposed on them. It is the only way in which returning to a life where
basic cultural goals (in the sense of Merton) such as making a living for
oneself and one’s family can be realised. Trying to earn a decent income
today means violating the norms institutionalised by the government.
The paper is supplemented by case studies which provide typical
examples of how Eritreans are affected by the WYDC and their attempts
to handle the situation. The case studies, which typify countless
individual fates, make clear that even the simplest personal aspirations
are unrealisable in today’s Eritrea.
T H E C O N C E P T O F A N O M I E
The term ‘anomie’ was ﬁrst applied by the French sociologist
Emile Durkheim, most prominently in Suicide (). It describes a
state of relative normlessness, or a lack of rules (dérèglement). Durkheim
also described it as a ‘state of disturbed order’. He pointed out that
anomie is not a sort of individual disease, but rather affects the state of a
given society as a whole.
The theory of anomie was further elaborated by Robert K. Merton in
his work Social Theory and Social Structure. Merton claimed that deviation
or deviant behaviour is linked to the state of a given society. His question
was why the frequency of deviant behaviour varies within different social
structures, and why these deviations have different forms and patterns in
different social structures (Merton : –).
Merton’s deﬁnition of anomie is linked to his deﬁnition of cultural
structure, which ‘may be deﬁned as that organized set of normative
 N I C O L E H I R T A N D A B D U L K A D E R S A L E H M O H A M M A D
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values governing behavior which is common to members of a designated
society or group’, while social structure is deﬁned as an ‘organized set
of social relationships in which members of the society or group
are variously implicated. Anomie is then conceived as a breakdown
in a cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute
disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured
capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them’ (ibid.: ,
emphasis added).
His central hypothesis was ‘that aberrant behaviour may be regarded
sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally prescribed
aspirations and socially structured avenues for realising these aspira-
tions’ (ibid.: ). A social condition in which culturally internalised
goals cannot be reached by socially accepted means is described as
anomie and favours deviant behaviour. Merton’s theoretical concept has
often been applied in the framework of deviance in the form of
criminality, but his approach was much more diverse. Anomic behaviour
may also occur in repressive political systems (see Waldmann ),
especially when the rulers try to suppress norms and values the majority
of the population has internalised during their socialisation, as we shall
see is the case in Eritrea.
An important point in Merton’s analysis is that there are various types
of deviant behaviour, far beyond criminality. In his scheme there are ﬁve
modes of individual adaptation in order to deal with cultural goals and
the institutionalised means to reach them:
. Conformity: Both goals and institutionalised means are accepted – this
is not deviant behaviour.
 Innovation: Cultural goals are internalised, but institutionalised
norms are not equally internalised as the sole strategy for reaching
these goals. In order to reach the goal ‘success’, ‘innovative’ means
such as criminality or corruption are applied.
 Ritualism: Cultural goals are abandoned, while conformity of behav-
iour is maintained. In order to avoid permanent frustration through
unfulﬁlled ambition, the level of one’s expectations is permanently
lowered. It is a form of private escape, like the zealously conformist
behaviour of employees in the lower bureaucracy.
 Retreatism: Both cultural goals and institutionalised means are
abandoned. The individual drops out of society.
 Rebellion: Alienation from both ruling goals and institutionalised
means, which are replaced by alternative goals and mechanisms
(Merton : –).
A N O M I E A N D F A M I L Y D I S I N T E G R A T I O N
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These different kinds of deviant behaviour will occur more often in a
disintegrated society, where the social structure precludes forms of
behaviour demanded by the cultural structure. In this situation, there is
a tendency towards the breakdown of existing norms and increasing
normlessness, that is, social anomie (ibid.: ). Merton stated that
anomie is not a stagnant situation; rather, the emergence and growth of
anomie are the results of an ongoing process. When deviant behaviour
proves ‘successful’ (or remains unsanctioned), the legitimacy of insti-
tutional norms will be lessened or even eliminated, thus enlarging the
extent of anomie in the system and the frequency of deviant behaviour
(ibid.: ).
In the political context of a society ruled by a dictatorial regime, it
makes sense to apply Merton’s elaborated theory of a discrepancy
between cultural (normative) structure and social structure. Moreover,
the various forms of deviant behaviour he elaborated provide valuable
indicators for measuring anomie. While rebellion may be hard to realise
in an authoritarian or totalitarian context, innovation, ritualism and re-
treatism can be good indicators of growing anomie.
Peter Waldmann, a German sociologist who devoted himself to the
adaptation of ‘anomie’ as a classical sociological concept to dictatorial
political systems, discusses the problems of empirical research based on
this concept. He stresses that in order to detect an anomic system, the
subjective feelings, psychological strain, or levels of suffering of individ-
uals are decisive criteria (: ). There are also indirect or secondary
indicators of anomie which can be deduced from empirical observation.
The most important indirect indicators of an anomic situation are
the different forms of deviant behaviour that occur in the system. He
summarises that the primary variables indicating anomie are a hybrid
normative structure and reduced commitment to accepted norms;
the different forms of deviant behaviour are the secondary variables
(ibid.: –). Merton has also identiﬁed subjective and objective com-
ponents of anomie, namely, personal feelings and life conditions
(Merton : ).
T H E C O N C E P T O F A N O M I E I N T H E E R I T R E A N C O N T E X T
In regard to Eritrean society and its growing level of anomie, we rely on
Merton’s concept. One major reason for choosing his approach is the
fact that Eritrean society does not suffer from normlessness or dérèglement
in the sense of Durkheim; there is, rather, a hybrid system of norms
and values strongly dominated by traditional norms, as we have shown in
 N I C O L E H I R T A N D A B D U L K A D E R S A L E H M O H A M M A D
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earlier empirical research conducted – (Hirt et al. ; Hirt
& Saleh ; see also Favali & Pateman ). Traditional norms and
values have developed over centuries among the various ethnic groups
of Eritrea: they are inﬂuenced by religion, modes of production (sede-
ntary agriculture, semi-pastoralism or pastoralism), primordial ties and
language (Saleh in prep.). They are based on different patterns of social
organisation and aim at safeguarding the stability of existing modes of
production and conﬂict mediation systems. A large variety of traditional
norms exists in Eritrea. Traditional norms ﬁnd their expression in
elaborate customary laws and their regulations, which have ruled social
life and conﬂict resolution throughout the centuries up to the present.
This fact is even acknowledged by Eritrea’s ruling party. Alemseged
Tesfai, one of the more distinguished PFDJ intellectuals, puts it as
follows:
We have referred (. . .) to the existence in Eritrea of a traditional civil
society. This may take the form of religious, self-help (. . .) – or purely social
associations and gatherings (. . .). Not only this, but, since in Eritrea, age and
the experience which goes with it are respected, community elders are
considered and accepted as an important social force (. . .). The same has
always applied to the clergy – the churches and mosques – the spiritual
and, therefore, highly inﬂuential leaders of Eritrean communities. (Tesfai
: ; see also Kibreab )
In spite of its recognition of these forms of social organisation, the
EPLF/PFDJ has tried to replace traditional forms of mutual solidarity by
government-imposed practices. Amanda Pool, who carried out ﬁeldwork
in Hagaz in the western lowlands in –, presents an example:
she observed that the traditional practice of ‘wofara’, traditional com-
munity work based on the principle of reciprocity, had been replaced by
‘ma’atot’, i.e. mandatory state labour. As one of her informants put it:
‘ma’atot was “a word coined by the government, just calling youngsters to
work, nothing in return”’ (Pool : ).
This does not mean that the traditional forms of societal organisation
are per se peaceful and free of violence. As Reid correctly notes, in a
region which has been inﬂuenced by long-term instability and violence
due to its geographical situation, militarised cultures and identities have
been nurtured and have manifested themselves in organisations such
as the EPLF and TPLF in the recent past (Reid : ). Moreover,
‘[v]iolence was not only a top-down imposition: communities had
supported and participated in violence against enemies old and new,
real and imagined’ (ibid.: ). However, violence initiated at the grass-
root level of society has overwhelmingly been rooted in land conﬂicts
A N O M I E A N D F A M I L Y D I S I N T E G R A T I O N
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which were frequently instrumentalised by the ruling powers to serve
their own ends (see Tronvoll ). Against this background, the ability
of established traditional institutions (or ‘traditional civil society’) to
mediate conﬂicts and safeguard survival in an often hostile environment
has been of utmost importance.
As in all contemporary societies, norms are in ﬂux in Eritrea, and we
assume that a hybrid system of three distinct norm and value systems
exist in the country today:
. The traditional norms and values of the various ethnic groups.
. The norms and values introduced by the EPLF during the armed
struggle, which are based on a socialist ideology, nationalism and the
principle of self-reliance.
. Liberal values of individualism and democracy, which have a certain
impact on the educated urban population and on the diaspora.
The struggle of the EPLF/PFDJ to dominate this hybrid system has been
going on for a long time: ‘Three decades of dramatic upheaval pro-
duced an independent state as well as a ruling nationalist ideology and a
revolutionary movement that emphasized, above all else, popular and
obedient mobilization for development and defence’ (O’Kane &
Redeker-Hepner : ix–x).
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the different patterns of
traditional Eritrean norms and values in detail; we believe that the case
studies we present will give an impression of the speciﬁc normative
and role conﬂicts persons affected by the WYDC ﬁnd themselves in.
However, we assume that before the introduction of the campaign, in
spite of the numerous violent conﬂicts the population was exposed to
in the past, inner-societal stability was high and the degree of anomie
low; a breakdown of the normative system has so far never occurred. This
is mainly due to the perseverance of the traditional norms. The EPLF/
PFDJ nolens volens still tolerates the role customary institutions play in
maintaining peace and stability. Jurisdiction based on customary laws is
widely practiced in civil law (for instance by Shari’a Courts and the
Community Courts introduced in ), but even criminal cases are
often relegated to traditional mediators (Shemagelle) by the courts (Hirt
et al. : –).
The WYDC is a new strategy of permanent military mobilisation
justiﬁed by the destruction caused by the ‘border war’ and the stalemate
in Ethiopian–Eritrean relations (Bozzini : ), combined with
ideological indoctrination of the young generation. According to
Kibreab, President Isaias claimed that Sawa was not founded for
 N I C O L E H I R T A N D A B D U L K A D E R S A L E H M O H A M M A D
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
military purposes. The aim was rather to overcome ‘primordial
afﬁliations’ which bedevil the ruling party and to create national loyalty
and ‘work ethic’ (Kibreab a: –). It means extreme interference
in the private lives of people and has a strong impact on the fabric of
society, rendering individuals unable to follow long-established role
expectations. The traditional norms cannot be applied in the national
service, which is a form of collective life under military discipline. More-
over, the WYDC endangers the very existence of the entire population by
forcing people into illegality for the simple purpose of earning money to
sustain their families. In Eritrea, all generations have so far internalised
respected customary values and cultural goals. Merton deﬁnes the
dominant cultural goal prevailing in the US as ‘monetary success’. In
Eritrea, as a poor society, aspirations may be more moderate, but of
course, founding a family and providing for it is the most basic goal
(probably common to all human cultures). The lineage or extended
family is the basic form of social belonging and has so far guaranteed
survival in the absence of a governmental social security network. Many
Eritreans depend on support from their relatives in the diaspora, but
they see it as their duty to contribute as much as they can to the wealth of
their (extended) family. We assume that basic cultural goals which are
common to all Eritreans irrespective of their speciﬁc ethnic or religious
belonging, and which at the same time are incompatible with the
nationalist demands of the PFDJ are the following:
To establish a nuclear family and regularly spend time together with one’s
spouse and children as well as with one’s extended family.
To sustain oneself and safeguard the subsistence of one’s family through
work.
A widespread, although not universally internalised goal is to seek
education and strive for a better life for oneself and the coming generation,
speciﬁcally among the urban segments of society.
To live up to personally deﬁned, individual or family-oriented goals
(these may vary widely depending on the socialisation into one’s particular
cultural environment; see for example the cases of Halima and Daniel
below).
By introducing the WYDC, the government is preventing a whole
generation from reaching these internalised cultural goals through
legitimate means. Avoiding indeﬁnite military service is only possible if
one lives as a draft dodger; bribes military commanders; works as a
government spy; or ﬂees the country. As deviant behaviour is a good
secondary indicator of anomie, the four variations elaborated by
Merton, namely innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion – in
distinction to conformity – will be applied in the Eritrean context.
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T H E I M P A C T O F W A R , M I L I T A R I S A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L S E R V I C E
O N F A M I L I E S A N D T H E S O C I A L S Y S T E M
The ‘border war’ with Ethiopia (–) and the WYDC have had
serious impacts on individuals and families; these range from resource
conﬂicts, separation, loss of life and property, violence, and physical
assault to the imprisonment and killing of those who try to cross the
borders to neighbouring countries. This section analyses the anomic
situation which has seized the organisational structure of Eritrean
society’s nuclear- and extended-family system.
The ﬁrst attempt of the EPLF/PFDJ to expand the inﬂuence of its
norm and value system during and after the armed struggle failed
because the ﬁghters, though dominant in the state apparatus, were a
minority in the country and demobilisation exposed them to the trad-
itional structures they had come from. The values of the struggle were
wartime values, including self-sacriﬁce and the extinction of individual-
ism; however, they also included positive values such as belonging to an
egalitarian community entailing shared responsibility. However, it
proved impossible for the leadership to convince the ex-ﬁghters to
maintain these values in peacetime, as they now had to take over the
responsibility for their families and redevelop a sound individualism,
while also relying on the support of the extended family. The govern-
ment was unable to create a social environment that could reconcile
both normative systems.
As Mahrt demonstrates in his study of peasants living in a highland
village, the rural civilian population did not adopt the EPLF’s creed of
national independence and self-rule, but rather supported the liber-
ation movement in the hope that it would provide better governance
than the Derg regime did. The peasants understood the liberation
struggle as a ‘traditional ﬁght’ between those in power and Shifta [rebels,
outlaws], while they maintained their own forms of political organis-
ation, including a Chica-shum (chief), Danya (judge) and baito (council)
(: –). While the villagers believed that the right to govern was
not derived from inheritance but had traditionally been gained from
war, the right to work land originated from inheritance, kinship or
marriage and thus fell in the traditional realm. The EPLF/PFDJ had
thus not been able to convince the peasants of its political ideas (ibid.:
–).
The war with Ethiopia and its aftermath brought a ‘second chance’ for
the PFDJ cadres to impose their ideology on the entire society. As has
been mentioned, the government had introduced the national service
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not only as military training and a development service but also as a tool
for imposing the EPLF’s values on the younger generation, especially in
regard to overcoming ‘sub-national’ orientations –meaning loyalty to
ethnic, regional and religious networks – and developing a culture of
nationalism and self-sacriﬁce. The introduction of the WYDC in 
can be seen as an attempt to perpetuate the revolutionary wartime
ideology and thus win a late victory over traditional values and
sentiments. As Woldemikael states:
The new Eritrean state aims to establish absolute state power by bringing the
whole society under the hegemony of the party in order to transform and
reshape that society in accordance with its own vision (. . .). The PFDJ has
been trying to (. . .) create a mode of citizenship characterized by submission
of individuality, culture, traditions, political aims, and human rights to the state’s
demands without resistance. (Woldemikael : , emphasis added; see also
Bondegaard : )
Even though they live in relative peace, the members of the younger
generation are supposed to live in an enduring war-simulating situation.
In an imitation of the situation in the ﬁeld during the struggle, all
civilian activities are subordinated to a militarised lifestyle. Individualism
is bedevilled, and all personal interests must be negated. Moreover,
during recent years it has become increasingly clear that the demand
to ‘overcome sub-national loyalties’ is primarily directed at the eight
non-Tigrinya ethnic groups of Eritrea and applies to a much lesser
extent to the Tigrinya as the largest ethnic group. The current political
system is dominated by Tigrinya who depend to a large extent on the
support of other ethnic Tigrinya to maintain their dwindling power
base; thus they use their language as a tool of domination in the
administration and the military. In Sawa, Tigrinya serves as the medium
of instruction, military training and communication. The use of
minority languages is not tolerated, which is a contradiction of the
government-sponsored mother-tongue policy in primary education.
Students who use languages other than Tigrinya or Tigre (the mother
tongue of roughly one third of the population) are intimidated, because
they are suspected of planning illicit activities such as ﬂight. Tigrinya
cultural demands are also treated more favourably; for instance,
students get leaves during Christian holiday periods while Muslim
students are denied the wish to spend their holidays at home. This policy
can be called a process of ‘hidden assimilation’ into the Tigrinya cultural
mainstream.
It is an obvious fact that this second attempt to impose the EPLF value
system is about to fail and is leading to an ever-greater state of social
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anomie, which is most clearly visible in the mass exodus of the younger
generation. Contrary to the hopes the former freedom ﬁghters had to
achieve a better future, the Warsay generation has been forced into a
lifestyle which not only seems senseless to them but also deprives them
of hope for the future. Every individual is now forced into military life,
forced to leave his or her family and the responsibilities towards it
behind, and forced to engage in activities which are simply imposed on
him/her by military commanders. Even seeking comfort in religion has
been prohibited, as this would run contrary to the PFDJ’s nationalist
ideology. It is an obvious fact that the promised rewards, such as the
rapid development of the economy, food security and national self-
reliance, are an illusion; the actual outcome of the campaign has been,
on the contrary, a rapid decline in economic performance and the living
standards of the population.
A N O M I E C A U S E D B Y T H E W A R S A Y – Y I K E A L O D E V E L O P M E N T
C A M P A I G N A N D P O S S I B L E C O P I N G S T R A T E G I E S
Since the introduction of the indeﬁnite national service, members of
the younger generation have experienced a severe conﬂict of roles in
attempting to fulﬁl their national obligation and to live a meaningful life
by realising their personal educational and career ambitions. Equally
importantly, they have been deprived of the ability to contribute to
their families’ incomes. In order to maintain a system that has none
or little support among the population, the government has set up a
far-reaching surveillance system, of which Bozzini () presents an
in-depth analysis. Military deserters and objectors are regularly hunted
by the military police and observed by various overlapping security
systems of the military, the police, the regional and local adminis-
trations, the President’s Ofﬁce, the PFDJ and the mass organisations
(Bozzini : ). In spite of the shortcomings of Eritrea’s ‘low-tech
surveillance’ system, the arbitrariness and unpredictability by which
rules and regulations are implemented and by which force is used
creates anxiety and mistrust as well as fatalism among the Warsay gen-
eration. On the one hand, it creates a sort of resignation (or retreatism
in the sense of Merton), as according to Bozzini’s observations, people
of conscript age seemingly become uncomplaining and unconcerned of
the misfortune of their friends captured by the military police. It leads to
compliance and despair, as concerned individuals want to avoid state
repression in the form of torture and months of imprisonment. This can
be seen as a ‘calculated manipulation’ that ‘produces homogenised
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docile bodies through the internalisation of moral and behavioural
norms promoted by the surveillant’ (Bozzini : ). This con-
formity of behaviour which the government tries to produce is, however,
not adapted by the conscripts as the EPFL/PFDJ leaders wish. In reality,
obedience is coerced, and forms of resistance ranging from silent
antipathy (a form of ritualism) to desertion (a form of innovation)
develop (ibid.).
The following section discusses the reactions and coping strategies
evident as a result of the prevailing state of social anomie using Merton’s
categories of deviant behaviour.
Characteristic features of anomie
Our empirical study examines primary (direct) indicators of anomie in
relation to established norms and cultural goals. These indicators
include feelings of dissatisfaction, insecurity, guilt and depression.
Secondary indicators, such as an increase in deviant behaviour in the
form of innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion, will be demon-
strated using exemplary case studies. As empirical research opportu-
nities are extremely limited in present-day Eritrea, long-term participant
observation was our most important research tool. The speciﬁc infor-
mation presented in the case studies was gathered through narrative
interviews and target-oriented conversations carried out during ﬁeld-
work by both authors between  and . This paper presents six
cases out of a sample of fourteen. All names have been changed to grant
anonymity, and in some cases speciﬁc characteristics have been altered
in order to further protect the person’s identity. However, Muslim and
Christian names indicate the real religious afﬁliation of the individuals.
Our sample of fourteen case studies does not claim to be rep-
resentative, but it does demonstrate features common to the majority of
those affected by the WYDC. Seven members of the research sample
were Muslim, seven were Christian. Five were women; nine were men.
Among the women, three were national service recruits and two (both of
them Muslim) had not registered for the service but both had husbands
who were soldiers. Eight members of our sample had a grade-eleven
education or higher, and the remaining six had no formal education,
were housewives or maids, or worked in the agricultural sector before
being conscripted. Nine people were from Asmara or had lived there for
a long period; the rest were from a rural or semi-urban environment in
the Southern Region. Seven out of the nine males of our sample group
had escaped Eritrea by , which reﬂects the uncontrollable mass
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exodus which is currently taking place. The ages within our sample
group ranged from  to  years, with an average age of  years. Those
who were in the army and national service had served from two years up
to · years, with an average length of ﬁve years (with the three cases
doing only nominal service excluded). Among the men, the average
duration of service was eight years (these numbers are as of summer
). None of them had any hope of being released anytime in the
near future.
In all cases, with the exception of three people who avoided serving in
the WYDC by bribing ofﬁcers or obtaining a medical exemption, the
desired biography of the person in question has been severely disturbed:
Eight members of the sample were deprived of the right to carry on their
education or practice the profession they had studied; as a result, seven
were unable to care for their family ﬁnancially. In three cases, the
national service led to divorce or separation from a partner, and one
woman was widowed when her husband was shot while trying to cross the
border. All of them had experienced personal harm caused by the
WYDC during the research period. In a highly anomic environment, all
members of our sample group had to resort to deviant behaviour in the
sense of Merton in order to ﬁnd a solution to their dilemma. It should
be noted that our aim is not to show exceptional cases, but similar
experiences belong to the everyday life of all Eritreans. The following
behavioural patterns are frequent as a consequence of the WYDC.
Innovation
Innovation is practiced when cultural goals are internalised but insti-
tutionalised norms are not equally internalised. Given the fact that the
vast majority of the Eritrean population tries to achieve traditional
cultural goals, a great deal of creativity is used to avoid the institutionally
prescribed national service. Various strategies are utilised to circumvent
life as a recruit.
Innovation by draft dodging
Many young Eritreans try to avoid being conscripted into the army. They
do not register for military service as they are required to do when they
reach the age of ; they hide from the security agents who are roaming
the streets in search of civilians without exemption certiﬁcates; they do
not report back to their military unit after their annual holiday has
passed; they voluntarily fail in school exams in order to repeat a school
 N I C O L E H I R T A N D A B D U L K A D E R S A L E H M O H A M M A D
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
year instead of going to Sawa for their twelfth school year. Girls marry at
an early age and become pregnant – sometimes even without being
married – in order to avoid the service. Thus, the government’s military
security employs a large number of secret agents whose sole task is to
search for draft dodgers in streets, in bars, and by collecting information
from draft dodgers’ neighbours and acquaintances (see Treiber ;
Bozzini ).
The case of Halima and Ismail shows how the arrest of draft dodgers
can destroy entire families. Halima ( years old) is from the Southern
Region. In , she married Ismail, who was an agro-pastoralist. He
joined the army during the war with Ethiopia and was not demobilised.
In  he refused to go back to his military unit after a one-month
holiday because his monthly salary of  nakfa (E) was too small to
make a living. He worked illegally at a private construction ﬁrm and
became one of the many wanted draft dodgers. He was arrested in 
on charges of betraying the nation and was sent to Wi’a, a military prison
site. The family was cut off from the ﬁnancial support provided by
Ismail. The arrest of her husband changed everything for Halima and
her two little daughters. She received occasional support from her
husband’s family, but it was not enough to cover her needs to survive. So
she moved to Massawa, the coastal port city, to search for a job and to
educate her children, which was only possible in an urban environment.
While in jail, Halima’s husband became displeased with her, as his family
passed on false information regarding her activities in Massawa, where
she was working as a housemaid. After one year of imprisonment, Ismail
was released and sent back to his military unit, which was stationed in the
Gash-Barka Region, near the Sudanese border. After four months of
rehabilitation, that is, service under strict control to observe his beha-
viour, he decided to risk his life and attempt to cross the border to
Sudan with two of his friends. However, all three of them were shot and
killed by border commandos. Halima was devastated when she received
the news of Ismail’s death, and her pain was exacerbated by the frequent
queries of the children regarding their father. The three are now
alienated from the extended family because of Halima’s job and live
under extremely poor economic conditions. The children will not be
able to ﬁnish their education and will have to look for work as soon as
possible.
Halima’s case is an example of how state violence against national
service recruits affects all family members, particularly women and
children. The husband, for the sole ‘crime’ of trying to feed his family,
was jailed, alienated from his wife and ultimately shot while trying to
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cross the border to ﬁnd work in Sudan. His wife had to leave her place of
origin and violate traditional role-expectations, against her will, by
working as a housemaid. The children not only lost their father at an
early age but also ended up in poverty and isolation.
Innovation by trying to avoid the service
Exemptions are another way to escape the fate of being recruited into
the national service. They are hard to obtain, as only persons who are
considered physically or mentally unﬁt are exempted from the service.
People try to get the certiﬁcate by pretending to be ill, mad or over-
aggressive. Those who have the ﬁnancial capacity try to bribe ofﬁcials in
order to be discharged. Another way people attain an informal ex-
emption from the service is by bribing ofﬁcers to allow them to enjoy
extended periods of leave or to work in the administration, where they
can go about their own business while doing their service for only an
hour a day.
The case of Mekonnen ( years old) is typical of those who are ‘on
the better side of life’. Mekonnen comes from a well-to-do family in
Asmara; his parents own a large retail shop and have good relations with
the government. During the s, they opened a restaurant, which is
managed by Mekonnen. When the war started in , he was
conscripted but managed to get a job as the driver of a high-ranking
ofﬁcer, who employed him more or less nominally and who accepted
bribes in return for leaving him undisturbed. After the end of the war,
Mekonnen was not demobilised but continued his nominal job. He is
formally regarded as a national service recruit. About once a month he is
called to drive the ofﬁcer around for a few days; the rest of his time is at
his own disposal, and he is free to get on with his business. He stresses
that he is a soft and peaceful person and is glad that he never had to go
through the hard military training. He feels content with his life, without
considering his privileged position as something exceptional or unjust.
His conviction is that whoever is in a position to avoid the national
service will do so. However, even privileged persons such as Mekonnen
are living under anomic conditions, as their maintenance of their
comfortable lives and business enterprises is never secure.
Innovation by exodus
Exodus is the last alternative for those who cannot deal with the situation
any longer. Fleeing the country has become a mass phenomenon in
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recent years. Young people cross the borders to the neighbouring
countries under the threat of death. If they are discovered while trying
to escape they may be shot on the spot or arrested and placed in a
camp for an unspeciﬁed period, usually for about two years. After the
prison term is up, they are sent back to their military unit, where they
remain under tight control and have to perform hard labour. Torture,
physical abuse and beatings are common in military prison camps,
although former inmates are reluctant to talk about what happened to
them there, at least if they are still in Eritrea. Those who leave the
country to escape from the national service put their families
and parents in a critical situation. The parents are accused of facilitating
the escape of their sons and daughters, either ﬁnancially or morally,
which in the logic of the government is an act of treason. They are
obliged to pay , nakfa (E,) when one of their dependants
escapes; otherwise they go to prison, unless they are released on
bail (Amnesty International (AI) ). This punishment has been
introduced as a subtle weapon to generate a moral conﬂict for those who
feel responsible towards their relatives; however, given the desperate
situation in the country, this strategy has not paid off. In  almost
, Eritrean refugees were registered in Sudan (UNHCR :
), not including the large number who had not reported to the
authorities, but had instead sought work in Khartoum and other large
cities. In , about , Eritreans crossed the border to Sudan
every month (IRIN ). In February , , Eritreans were
registered as refugees in Ethiopia (UNHCR a: ). Many of those
who manage to reach Sudan try to make their way to Europe via the
Sahara Desert to Libya and from there by boat to Malta or Italy.
Accordingly, the number of registered Eritrean refugees in Italy rose
from  in  to , in . The respective ﬁgures for Malta,
which is infamous for having deported hundreds of Eritreans back to
their country, are seven for  and , for . The numbers of
Eritreans asking for asylum in Switzerland rose from  in  to
, in ; the ﬁgures for Sweden are  and ,, respectively.
Israel has become a favoured destination for Eritreans, too, and
reported an inﬂux of almost , in  (UNHCR b). This
list could be continued and does not indicate the complete number of
refugees. There is without doubt an evident connection between the
introduction of the WYDC and the steady increase in the number of
Eritreans leaving their country.
Ali’s case is typical of those who try to leave the country by all means.
He is  years old, from the Central Region, and was recruited in .
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He experienced the war with Ethiopia, and his two best friends lost their
lives in the third Ethiopian offensive. After the peace agreement in
, his hope was to be demobilised, but he was kept in a military
position. He felt desperate and made plans to escape with some like-
minded friends. In , when his military unit was shifted to Gash-
Barka, some of his friends managed to cross the border, but he could
not join them. At that time, his family’s situation was miserable because
his father had become ill. The family had no money with which to seek
adequate medical treatment. Ali’s younger brother left school and
began to work various daily-wage jobs to support his family. Some
months later he was arrested because he had reached the age of  and
had dropped out of school but had not reported for his national service.
Ali felt ashamed that he, as the eldest son, instead of supporting his
family was unable to assist them. The only option he had to improve the
ﬁnancial situation was to try crossing the border and ﬁnd employment in
Sudan. Thus, it was only a matter of time before he made another
attempt. Unfortunately, Ali was arrested at the border along with four
others in , and all of them were sent to prison for one year. When
he was released, he was sent back to his unit. As he explained, it was hard
for him to survive in the hostile environment of the military camp, where
his superiors viewed him as a traitor. Finally, in late , Ali managed to
escape, together with two friends. His family learned about his ﬂight
from a relative in Sudan.
This case is a typical example of the incompatibility of the normative
system imposed by the government and the civil normative structure
which implies that the eldest son is responsible for maintaining the
family when the father gets sick. Although Ali was not married, he
experienced great psychological stress because he was not in a position
to care for his parents and younger siblings. As the anomic pressure was
very strong, he tried to ﬂee at all costs. By working in Sudan he is able to
fulﬁl his family’s expectation that he will support them, a possibility he is
denied in his own country.
Treiber presents an example of a young man from a different
cultural background, but with a similar pattern of innovative behaviour:
Biniam, a former university student, seemingly accepted his national
duty by working in the administration as a national service recruit; at
the same time, he was running his girlfriend’s bar while silently plann-
ing his ﬂight into exile, ‘from where he hoped to better support
his children and live a life of security and peace’ (Treiber : ). As
in many cases, it is unknown if his attempt to ﬂy to Ethiopia was
successful.
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Human trafﬁcking – the other side of ‘innovation’
The anomic situation caused by the WYDC also yielded innovative beha-
viour in the more conventional sense, i.e. in the form of criminality and
corruption on the part of army ofﬁcers and other individuals who are
making a proﬁt out of the mass exodus: In its report of July , the
UNSC monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea revealed that high-
ranking Eritrean militaries, most prominently Major General Tekle
‘Manjus’ Kiﬂai, were involved in human trafﬁcking across the border to
Sudan: they charged about US $  for a border-crossing and for
smuggling the escapees to Egypt through the Sudanese desert (United
Nations : –). Hundreds of Eritrean refugees who tried to
reach Israel fell into the hands of human trafﬁckers from the Rashaida
ethnic group who cooperated with both agents of the Eritrean and the
Sudanese governments. The escapees were held hostage in the Egyptian
Sinai Peninsula by Arab Bedouin clans where they were subjected to
physical abuse and mistreatment, while ransom payments of about US $
, were extorted from family members residing in the diaspora to
let them continue their journey to Israel. A part of them even fell victim
to illicit ‘organ harvesting’ operations. A large number of Eritreans is
involved in these criminal human trafﬁcking activities (for details, see
International Commission on Eritrean Refugees (ICER) Press Release
..).
Ritualism
Ritualistic behaviour means that cultural goals are abandoned while
conformity is maintained. In the Eritrean administration, there are
numerous individuals who have been ‘frozen’ (medeskal) by the
government, which means they receive their salary but do not have any
meaningful tasks. Nevertheless, they appear at their ofﬁce every day, as
they are deprived of alternatives. This pattern of behaviour also applies
to those national service recruits who accept their fate and never attempt
to ﬂee or overstretch their holidays. They either do not marry or neglect
their families. Many of them suffer from psychological problems caused
by delusion. Ritualism may even start during childhood: many ele-
mentary and secondary school students study only half-heartedly
because they want to avoid being recruited into the military and having
to work for the national service for an unlimited number of years once
they have ﬁnished the twelfth grade.
Riggan carried out ﬁeldwork in Assab in , shortly after the
introduction of the twelfth school year at Sawa had been announced.
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Simultaneously, the Ministry of Education had issued a directive to the
teachers that no student should fail in the exams, irrespective of his or
her personal performance. She observed the profound effect of this
measure: ‘Many students expressed sentiments that education had no
worth anymore. Others tried to fail, and, when they realized they could
not fail, tried to ﬁnd other ways to delay completing eleventh grade’
(Riggan : ). It is interesting to note that ‘education’ as a cultural
goal internalised by many young people as a means to future success was
immediately abandoned when the goal ‘success’ seemed no longer
available. According to Riggan, prior to the introduction of the WYDC,
both teachers and students believed that education should provide both
bright futures for individuals and development for the nation; this was
incompatible with the fact that now Sawa had become the last desti-
nation. For the government, schools had become institutions meant to
create obedient students of military discipline with docile minds, while
teachers desired respectful students, too, but for the sake of playing a
role in the development of the nation as educated citizens (ibid.: –).
Both goals have proven to be largely incompatible.
Retreatism
In the case of retreatism, both cultural goals and institutionalised means
are abandoned. The individual drops out of society. Alcoholism, as one
form of retreatism, is common in Eritrea among men who have given up
trying to cope with the difﬁcult situation. Treiber, who conducted an
ethnographic study among the youth in Asmara during the early s,
came to know many young men who spent their time in bars or
nightclubs and vividly portrays a situation in which such activities have
become ‘strategies for controlling one’s own body amid heavily
circumscribed demands on time, leisure, and personal agency’ (:
). This control is, however, only imaginary for many youths. Mesﬁn,
a young man in his late twenties whose fate Treiber describes as one
who had become a ‘nihilist drunkard’ as he saw no better alternatives
for himself, died in  as a consequence of his alcohol abuse (ibid.:
–).
Those who drink often become aggressive towards their wives and
children.
The case of Salma ( years old) demonstrates the fate of a woman
who has suffered from the violent behaviour of her husband, who
is trapped in the national service. Salma was married in  at the age
of . Her husband Mohammed was  years old and had been
 N I C O L E H I R T A N D A B D U L K A D E R S A L E H M O H A M M A D
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
conscripted since ; he received a payment of  nakfa per month,
of which he was supposed to give  nakfa to his wife. Soon after the
marriage, however, it became clear that he did not care to support Salma
ﬁnancially, even though she was pregnant. Mohammed had grown up in
a rural environment in the Southern Region. Before joining the army,
he had supported his family by cultivating and harvesting. Once in the
military he started to drink, even though he was a Muslim from a
conservative background. He was not satisﬁed with his life and was
frustrated by his poor economic situation. After his marriage he took his
frustrations out on his wife, as he could not fulﬁl her expectations and
those of his clan. Salma eventually had to move to her uncle’s house in
order to survive, and her daughter became sick due to being under-
weight. Salma was now determined to get divorced. Mohammed refused
to accept a divorce, as this would be an admission of his personal failure,
but Salma refused to return to his house. Finally, in , the leaders of
Mohammed’s clan intervened and convinced him to accept the divorce.
Salma decided to take her life into her own hands and managed to ﬁnd
work as a housemaid, leaving her daughter with her uncle’s family.
Military recruits often develop psychological disturbances due to the
conﬂict of roles they ﬁnd themselves in. In this case the husband wanted
to maintain his nominal role as the family head while leaving the
responsibility for his wife and child to her uncle. His reaction is a typical
case of retreatism. He was alienated from his cultural roots and retreated
to alcohol abuse and aggression. From Salma’s point of view, her
aspirations to lead a family life with a caring husband and several
children were not fulﬁlled. She now ﬁnds herself in the difﬁcult position
of being a divorced woman with a child, something which makes it hard
for her to remarry within her conservative cultural environment.
Without the support of her extended family, she would have been
unable to manage her life. Her fate is typical of the majority of mothers
in Eritrea, who do not receive any support while their husbands are in
the national service.
Retreatism in cases of psychological trauma
Many young people have suffered psychological trauma and/or suffer
from a mental disorder. A great many of those who fought in the Ethio-
Eritrean War were traumatised and did not receive adequate pro-
fessional support (see Fleischhauer ). Those who were arrested and
tortured after an attempt of draft-dodging often end up in retreatism as
well. Treiber presents the case of Andom, who was detained at the
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notorious Nokra Island prison and, after his release, became apathetic
and uninterested in his environment. Similar to Mohammed, he
became aggressive when he was drunk and randomly attacked people,
which made others believe that he had become ‘antisocial’ (Treiber
: –), an indication that he had abandoned his once internalised
norms and values.
Equally traumatised were those women who suffered sexual assaults
and rape. It is an open secret that involuntary relationships and rape
occur in the military, but our respondents, thereby representing the
attitude of the general public, were reluctant to report cases of sexual
harassment because they are a social taboo and there is no chance that
such assaults will be brought before a court. Young women who join the
national service have to suffer this violence silently. If it becomes known
that a woman has been a victim of rape, she is stigmatised and will have
great difﬁculty ﬁnding a husband.
Yordanos ( years old), whose mother was an unmarried hairdresser,
was drafted into the military when the border war started in . After
the end of the war, she was kept in the national service and assigned to
an ofﬁcer to work as his maid. He soon started to make advances towards
her. When she refused to start a relationship with him, he made her
work in the hot sun for hours without rest. Yordanos felt desperate, but
she was determined to defend herself and not to give in to his demands.
After some time, she learned that her ofﬁcer’s superior was moving into
a military camp some miles away. While she was on duty she managed to
escape to that camp and tell her story to the superior ofﬁcer. She was
lucky, as he was more honourable than her immediate superior and she
was transferred to another unit and demobilised in . But now she
faced isolation: although she had fought as a soldier in the war against
Ethiopia, she was not honoured by society; instead, she experienced
stigmatisation and exclusion. She began to work as a hairdresser like
her mother, but she felt isolated and lonely and was barely able to make
a living. Two years later she managed to go to Saudi Arabia, where she
now works as a housemaid for a rich family. Yordanos was not able to
fulﬁl any of her aspirations to lead a digniﬁed life and improve her
personal situation. She would have liked to get married and to have a
beauty salon of her own, but due to her ‘career’ in the military, people
viewed her with even more suspicion than they had done before because
of her being an illegitimate child. Her work in Saudi Arabia allows her to
earn a relatively better income, but she is deprived of a private life,
marriage and children and is completely at the disposal of her
employers.
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This case, which demonstrates the typical fate of many female
conscripts, shows clearly that the so-called ‘heroines’ of the war are in
no way rewarded by the government, despite its nationalist and war-
glorifying ideology. Once they return to civil life, these women’s destiny
is determined by traditional role expectations which they were forced to
break against their will.
Asia Abdulkadir, an Eritrean scholar who interviewed refugees in
Sudan, has discovered that incidents of sexual violence in the military
are frequent but that the women affected are reluctant to report them
and completely unwilling to talk about their personal experiences
(Abdulkadir : ).
Retreatism in the form of suicide is the last resort for many of those
trapped in the military. During the period from August  to August
, we learned of twelve cases of suicide in different neighbourhoods
of Asmara, a number which indicates the prevalence of suicide. While
young men often shoot or hang themselves, young women reportedly
swallow liquid poison or burn themselves after pouring kerosene on
their body and their clothes. The parents are not supposed to talk about
how their children died, as the government wants to maintain the
picture of the heroic youth serving their country with enthusiasm.
Rebellion
The mass exodus of many young people can also be seen as a form of
rebellion, which in Merton’s characterisation means alienation from
both ruling goals and institutionalised means, and the replacement of
these with alternative goals and mechanisms. In some cases, young
people leave the country to be free of both the traditional role ex-
pectations of their families and the government’s nationalist expectation
of self-sacriﬁce. Those who rebel against private and EPLF/PFDJ norms
are more likely to be young women from the urban middle class and
those who have not been thoroughly exposed to both the traditional and
the government’s norm systems, for instance, young Eritreans brought
up in the diaspora whose parents returned with them during the s.
Daniel ( years old) is the son of a family that resided in a European
country for many years and returned soon after independence to build a
new life in Eritrea. Unlike many Eritreans who lived abroad, Daniel’s
family did not acquire European citizenship for the family members, so
Daniel had no chance to leave the country when he got into trouble. In
 he was  years old and frustrated with his life. He had never
managed to thrive in the Eritrean school system, as he had spent his ﬁrst
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school years in Europe, and he complained that the Eritrean system was
very rigid. He had no idea which professional career he should follow
and longed to return to Europe. Daniel liked to spend the weekends at
discos for some entertainment, and he had somehow managed to get a
false foreign passport indicating that he was  to get admission. This
would turn out to be very unfortunate for him, as a security agent
searching for draft dodgers discovered this fact and turned him in.
Daniel was arrested for forgery of documents and kept in prison until he
reached the age of . He was then immediately sent to military training
and was later kept in the national service. About four years later, in ,
he managed to escape to Ethiopia with some friends. He did not stay
there but instead continued his journey to Sudan, where he hoped to be
able to get support from relatives in Europe. After crossing the border
from Ethiopia to Sudan, Daniel and his comrades were arrested by
Sudanese border guards who stripped them of all their belongings.
Daniel had a hard time but was able to make it to Khartoum, where he
stayed throughout . In  he managed to get to Libya with the
help of an organised human trafﬁcking organisation, which he paid for
the transport across the Sahara Desert to Libya. From there he was able
to inform his friends living in the diaspora that he intended to board a
boat and continue his journey to Malta or Italy, like most Eritreans who
try to make their way out of Sudan. At that time Daniel faced two
different risks: being arrested by the Libyan authorities like thousands of
his countrymen, who subsequently remained stuck in Libyan prisons or
refugee camps or were even deported to Eritrea or drowning in the
Mediterranean like hundreds of other illegal migrants who have tried in
vain to reach European soil by boat.
From the time of his youth, when his parents decided to return to
Eritrea, Daniel has not been able to follow his own ambitions to ﬁnish
his education in Europe; instead he had to spend the ﬁrst years of his
adult life in prison and in the military without being able to complete
his secondary education. His attempt to make it anyway is a form of
rebellion against both the government and his parents’ aspirations to
have him live in his mother country.
A widespread form of rebellion had been the massive movement of
theWarsay generation towards evangelical churches since the end of the
Ethio-Eritrean War, which is an indicator of alienation from both
traditional values and the political values of the PFDJ – a turn towards
the alternative normative system provided by these religious commu-
nities. Before their ban in , members of the ‘Pente’ churches, as
they are dubbed by Eritreans, used to proselytise aggressively, especially
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among the youth. Treiber argues that the crackdown on these churches
can be quite easily understood: the evangelical churches observed a
much stronger intake than the National Union for Youth and Students,
the PFDJ mass organisation, did. They had become a counterbalance
that developed autonomously, was hard to control and politically un-
reliable. Thus, the government tried to stop the ‘Pentes’ before they
could become dangerous for the PFDJ. In fact, ‘Pente’ Christians refused
to be ‘political’ in the sense of the PFDJ, this being a political act in itself
demonstrating fundamental opposition to government policies (Treiber
: , ).
A F O R M O F F O R C E D R E T R E A T I S M : T H E I N C R E A S I N G N U M B E R
O F B E G G A R S A S A C O N S E Q U E N C E O F A N O M I E
During the s the number of beggars in Asmara was small and
Eritreans often stressed that they were proud not ‘to be a society of
beggars’. Poor children were selling cigarettes, chewing gum, peanuts
and the like to improve the income of their families, but they did not
resort to directly asking people for money. The gradual but continuous
increase in begging which has taken place in recent years has coincided
with the introduction of the WYDC. There has been a steady increase in
the number of beggars from year to year, with a dramatic expansion of
the phenomenon in  and . The prolonged national service
has rendered the traditional solidarity network defunct, as the members
of the workforce are no longer earning enough money to support their
families. In addition, increased divorce, out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and
psychological disturbances are forcing more and more people to sit in
the streets and beg for money. Since , the number of beggars, as
one of the authors could observe until the end of , has remained
stable on a high level. There are regular razzias by the government in
which the streets are ‘swept’ and people found begging are transported
to so-called ‘rehabilitation centres’ or to their respective home areas.
The beggars sitting at street corners waiting for handouts are typically
elderly women and young mothers with small children. The elderly
women have fallen through the cracks of the social networks as their
children have died in the war with Ethiopia, have left the country, are
imprisoned, or have been kept in the national service and are unable to
send money. The number of young mothers begging with their children
has signiﬁcantly increased over the past couple of years. Recently more
andmore young mothers with several children, from babies up to ﬁve- or
six-year-olds, have become beggars. The fact that they have two or three
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children is an indicator that these women are married, and that their
husband is no longer able or willing to feed and house his family. He
may be trapped in the national service, be serving a prison sentence for
draft dodging, or be stranded in Sudan or another country without
being able to remit money.
Only in the past couple of years have children resorted to directly
begging for money. According to the traditional values of Eritrean
society, sending children out to beg is intolerable; it can thus be assumed
that these children have parents who are unable to make ends meet, and
thus let their children go begging out of desperation. This is a further
indicator of the familial disintegration caused by the so-called develop-
ment campaign, which keeps husbands far from their families, meaning
that the latter have to cope without any income or compensation from
the government.
C O N C L U S I O N S
In the period since  the Eritrean people have experienced thirty
years of a liberation struggle, a short period of peace that lasted for
seven years, two years of a devastating ‘border war’ with Ethiopia, and
eleven years of a no-war/no-peace situation. Remarkably, the level of
societal disintegration during these challenging times has never been as
high as during recent years, namely, since the introduction of the
WYDC. Its implementation was justiﬁed with the unsolved conﬂict with
Ethiopia, which did not accept the verdict of an international border
commission and was not ready to cede territory awarded to Eritrea. The
Eritrean government reacted by abandoning plans for demobilisation
and by recruiting more youngsters into the army of more than ,
conscripts every year. It has since effectively turned the economy into a
party- and military-controlled venture based on the ‘free’ labour pro-
vided by the Warsay generation. Forced labour has replaced the free
labour market, especially in the ﬁelds of cash-crop agriculture and
construction. As demonstrated in this article, this has led to a rapid
increase in anomie and family disintegration and to the spectacular mass
exodus of the younger generation.
It is hard to grasp the logic of this social experiment. The unlimited
service completely undermines the morale of the armed forces: instead
of defending the country, conscripts dream of ﬂeeing to the neighbour-
ing countries to escape their fate. If the Eritrean government’s primary
aspiration was to train a reliable defence force, it could have maintained
the original -month duration of the service. The ofﬁcial argument for
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the campaign is that in order to rebuild the war-devastated country
within the framework of the government’s self-reliance strategy,
voluntary labour is necessary for sufﬁcient infrastructure construction
to initiate a process of development. At the same time, the economy is
being strangled under a command economy that heavily restricts the
private sector and foreign investment. What is worse is that the national
service recruits do not even receive a salary adequate to support
themselves, not to mention their nuclear and extended families. There
is no longer any ‘normality’ of life: one can no longer live up to the
general norms and values without breaking the laws of the government.
The widespread network of state surveillance based on police violence
and the encroachment on the population by national security agents
endangers the fabric of Eritrean society by jeopardising social
relationships and mutual trust (Bozzini : ) and by forcing the
people into various forms of ‘deviant behaviour’ such as desertion and
illegal exit of the country. This is done under the pretext of the
government’s (futile) effort to impose ideological and physical control
on its subjects. As an International Crisis Group report aptly remarks:
‘The social fabric [of Eritrea] is now under great strain. While the
government has long believed it can rely on a fundamental patriotism
and that Eritreans can accept prolonged hardship, millions are in-
creasingly disengaging from the state and even their own communities –
and focus only on immediate family, preoccupied with seeking ways to
survive and ultimately escape’ (: ).
The negative consequences of this strategy are affecting the economy,
the educational sector, state institutions and the core of societal organ-
isation. They will be felt for years to come, and may ultimately lead to
state failure, if no immediate policy changes are introduced – an action
which is unlikely under the present leadership.
N O T E S
. For different analyses of the Eritrean–Ethiopian war, see: Trivelli ; Gilkes & Plaut ;
Tadesse ; Negash & Tronvoll ; Hirt ; Entner ; Reid ; Habte .
. In early , President Isaias announced on the Eritrean State Television a so-called
‘environmental campaign’: all reservists who had ﬁnished their -month military training at the
Sawa camp and their subsequent national service from  onward and had thus been demobilised
were called back on duty to participate in a campaign which included reforestation efforts. This
event, which equals to a hidden mobilisation a few months before the war broke out has, to the
knowledge of the authors, not been documented in any analysis of the war, but both of them
personally remember the event.
. In , approximately , persons were demobilised, many of them women. In ,
approximately , people were demobilised –most of them had already been working in
government ofﬁces and did not change their type of work, but they received regular salaries after
demobilisation (see World Bank ).
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. National Service conscripts receive  Nakfa during the ﬁrst year,  Nakfa during the
second year, and between  and , Nakfa during subsequent years of their service, depending
on their educational qualiﬁcation (personal observation and communication of the authors with
conscripts).
. The asmarino.com report is based on interviews conducted by HRCE (Human Rights Concern
Eritrea) with two former workers at the Bisha site who had escaped to Ethiopia. It has to be noted that
asmarino.com as an Eritrean opposition website cannot be considered an independent source of
information, but the interviews appear credible and ﬁt into the strategy of the government to employ
WYDC conscripts in all ﬁelds of the Eritrean economy.
. Sawa is a military training camp in the western lowlands (Gash-Barka Region), where the
military training usually takes place and where a boarding school for all twelfth-grade students was
established in . In everyday language, ‘going to Sawa’ is equated with being a national service
(agelglot) conscript.
. At its third (and so far last) congress in  the EPLF renamed itself the PFDJ without making
signiﬁcant changes to its Marxist organisational structure (see EPLF ).
. Towards the end of the liberation struggle in , the EPLF’s membership reached a peak of
approximately , combatants, out of a population of approximately three million (see
Bruchhaus & Mehreteab ).
. In Sawa and the other military camps, reading the Bible or the Quran is forbidden. In
numerous cases those who refuse to hand over their respective holy books to the military ofﬁcers have
been arrested and placed in metal containers for punishment (for details of human rights violations
in the military see Human Rights Watch ).
. Wi’a, situated in the Southern Red Sea Region and one of the hottest places on earth, is used
as both a military training camp and a military prison.
. The port city of Massawa is known as an urban area where prostitution is widespread; thus, the
mere decision by a woman to seek a job there can lead to suspicion in her family that she might earn
her income through prostitution.
. For human rights conditions and methods of torture and mistreatment, see Human Rights
Watch () and Amnesty International ().
. In , , students attended the twelfth grade at Sawa. Only , of them passed the
matriculation exam and were thus able to attend the technical colleges, the only form of tertiary
education left in the country since the university was closed in . The remaining , students
received some educational training or were directly transferred to the army (source: informant, name
withheld).
. In , some  Eritreans were held in the Misratah detention center in Libya.
Amnesty International warned that  of them were about to be forcibly returned to
Eritrea. Although the deportation did not take place, Eritreans are in a precarious situation
in Libya, which is not a signatory of international treaties to protect the rights of refugees (see AI
).
. In August ,  Eritreans died on their passage from Libya to Italy after their boat ran out
of fuel. They were not picked up by passing vessels or Italian boarder guards. Five people were
rescued after having spent three weeks on the boat (Welt online, ).
. This section is based on personal observation over extended periods between  and
.
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